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Abstract: This thesis investigates achievements in human development outcomes on 
health, education, and poverty indicators across Indian states, in order to discern what 
factors might influence a state’s better orientation toward social policies. After 
conducting data analysis, the study explains differences in outcomes, as achieved by 
Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, by building an argument of subnational solidarity and its 
impact on determining the state’s policy agendas.  
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Chapter One 
 
Where does India stand? – The problem of the poor 
India is a compilation of contradictions and a study in contrasts. With 1.3 billion 
citizens, India is the world’s largest democracy; but the nation that governs via 
representation the world’s largest democratic populous is also home to its largest number 
of poor. According to a 2016 World Bank report, “India is by far the country with the 
largest number of people living under the international US$1.90-a-day poverty line, 224 
million, more than 2.5 times as many as the 86 million in Nigeria, which has the second-
largest population of the poor worldwide...India accounts for one in three [of the poor 
worldwide.]”1(emphasis added)  India not only sustains the unexpected simultaneity of 
persistent mass poverty with successful democratic practices but also uniquely includes 
and relies on its poor for the success of its democratic operation. This is evident in Perry 
Anderson’s statement, “a truly distinguishing feature of Indian democracy – one that sets 
it apart from any other society in the world...In India alone, the poor form not just the 
overwhelming majority of the electorate, but vote in larger numbers than the better-off. 
Everywhere else, without exception, the ratio of electoral participation is the reverse.”2 
The electorate’s resilience against an arguably justified sense of disenfranchisement with 
a State that has failed too many on too many accounts is further evident in the nation’s 
ever-rising voter turnout rates. With 540 million Indians voting, which is not only their 
fundamental right but also foremost civic duty, the 2014 general election set a national 
                                                
1  "Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016." World Bank. N.p., 2016. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.  
2 Anderson, Perry. "LRB · Perry Anderson · After Nehru." London Review of Books. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
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record with the highest ever voter turnout at 66.4 percent, putting India fourth in the 
world rankings on voter turnout.3  
Adding to this political-economy conundrum of India’s mass poverty parallel with 
its democratic politics, is the fact that India is no longer just a poor economy; crossing the 
two-trillion mark in 2016,4 India has been one of the largest contributors to the world 
economy over the past decade; alone accounting for ten percent of the increase in global 
economic activity since 2005 and forging a threefold rise in its national per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (in purchasing power parity terms) since 2000.5 After taking 60 years 
to reach the $one-trillion mark, India added the next trillion in just seven years; the 
economy has almost doubled in size since the 2008 global financial crisis, and has more 
than quadrupled from the start of this millennium.6 Today, India is the sixth and third 
largest economy in the world and in Asia, respectively, while in purchasing power parity 
terms, it has the world’s third-largest Gross Domestic Product.7 
 India has managed to establish its global presence on such a large scale by 
delivering continued improvement in economic performance since the liberalization, 
privatization, and globalization reforms undertaken in the early 1990s; when the 
government, amidst a liquidity crisis, dismantled the ‘license raj’ system of tight controls 
and permits in place since independence in 1947, thereafter diverging starkly from its 
prior socialist-like planned economy model that had been in place for over 40 years. In 
                                                
3 Timmons, Heather. "Here's How India's Record-setting Voter Turnout Compares to the Rest of the World." Quartz. Quartz, 13 May 
2014. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
4 India GDP  1960-2017 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News.” India GDP | 1960-2017 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | 
News, tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp.  
5 Corrigan, Gemma, and Attilio Di Battista. "19 Charts That Explain India's Economic Challenge." World Economic Forum. N.p., n.d. 
Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
6 Raghavan, Sharad, and TCA. "India Is Now a $2-trillion Economy." The Hindu. N.p., 02 July 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
7 "COUNTRY COMPARISON :: GDP (PURCHASING POWER PARITY)." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence 
Agency, n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
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the decades following independence, the nation suffered from a ‘Hindu growth rate’ of 
3.5 percent,8 largely as a result of a highly interventionist state employing a misguided 
import substitution trading regime.9 After three decades of generally low growth, during 
which slightly more than one person in two lived under the official poverty line,10 the 
Indian economy experienced a growth acceleration starting in the 1990s, thereafter, 
sustaining rapid economic growth that averaged a rate of six percent in the 1990s and 
eight percent in 2000s. Surpassing China in 2015, India established itself as the fastest 
growing economy in the world, and is projected by the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund to continue as such indefinitely.11  
While there has been a decline in the number of poor since the 1990s, the pace of 
poverty reduction has been relatively slow. For instance, every one percent GDP growth 
led to a 0.3 percent reduction of poverty in India, compared to China’s 0.8 
percent;12combined with the fact that China had also seen higher growth rates for several 
years previously leaves India’s overall poverty alleviation outcomes far behind those of 
China’s. The growth patterns adopted in 1990s help partly explain the paradoxical nature 
of high growth with low poverty reduction in India; since the patterns of economic 
growth largely influence how inclusive such growth might be. For example, taking 
advantage of housing the world's second-largest English-speaking population, India’s 
growth has been primarily driven by the service sector, which contributes almost 60 
                                                
8 Das, Gurcharan. “The India Model.” Foreign Affairs, 18 Jan. 2012, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-07-01/india-model.  
9  Kholi, Atul. “Politics Of Economic Growth In India, 1980-2005: Part I: The 1980S On JSTOR.” Politics Of Economic Growth In 
India, 1980-2005: Part I: The 1980S On JSTOR, Apr. 2006, www.princeton.edu/~kohli/docs/PEGI_PartI.pdf  
10 Datt , Gaurav, and Martin Ravallion. “Shining for the Poor Too? :” Economic and Political Weekly, 13 Feb. 2010, 
www.epw.in/journal/2010/07/special-articles/shining-poor-too.html?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D57f90f22307806827bd408a591db43f1.  
11 Babones, Salvatore. "India May Be The World's Fastest Growing Economy, But Regional Disparity Is A Serious Challenge." 
Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Jan. 2018. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
12 Sen Gupta, Abhijit, et al. Growth, Structural Change, and Poverty Reduction: Evidence from India. Nov. 2013, 
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/31214/south-asia-wp-022.pdf.  
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percent to the country’s GDP today, making India the second fastest growing service 
economy in the world.13 Information technology alone accounted for $108 billion worth 
of services exports in 2014-15, primarily to the United States and Europe.14 This too, 
however,  is not without contrast; India has arguably greater linguistic diversity than any 
other large country with 1652 languages listed on the 1961 census, of which 122 are 
spoken by over 10,000 people and the primary six are spoken by over 50 million people 
each. Still, India is home to the second largest English-speaking population of 125 
million people.15 India’s economic paradox is encapsulated by the different layers within 
its economic structure, which Ashutosh Varshney notes in stating, “for nearly a decade 
now, India has had the world’s fourth-largest concentration of dollar billionaires (after 
the United States, China, and Russia), its third-largest middle class (after China and the 
United States), and its single-largest concentration of poor people. This tripartite structure 
is new...India is thus simultaneously rich and poor.”16  
Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of poverty lines, a cursory look at the 
income and consumption profile of the population is informative to our understanding of 
where the masses stand and why India remains a low-middle income country. This 
cursory look allows us to note, foremost, that the lower bound for the richest income 
quintile (of Rs.1.5 lakhs) is just 1.5 times the nation’s per capita GDP and less than the 
minimum income requirement (of Rs. 2.5 lakhs) for one to qualify for income tax. The 
fact that just slightly over 20 percent of the population earns as much or above the 
                                                
13 Hutt, Rosamond. "India's Economy in Numbers." World Economic Forum. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
14 ibid 
15 ibid 
16 "Journal of Democracy." India's Democracy at 70: Growth, Inequality, and Nationalism | Journal of Democracy. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 
Apr. 2018. 
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nation’s per capita GDP, along with the fact that not all those who fall even in the highest 
income quintile earn enough to be eligible for income tax, indicates the low levels of 
earnings that a majority of the population face; whereby, the top 20 percent earners 
control 45 percent of the total income. Relatedly, while a political democracy with 
diverse representation on all political fronts, India is a not a fiscal democracy; for every 
100 voters it has only 7 income taxpayers. This astoundingly low tax-base results from 
two factors: first, low earnings, especially in the unregulated informal sector that 
accounts for 92 percent of the Indian economy, such that, 90 percent of the population in 
urban areas and 95 percent in rural areas earns less than 2.5 lakhs annually, disqualifying 
this majority from income tax liability. Second, equally if not more importantly, this 
results from the state’s policy choice of setting the qualifier at a level equivalent to 250 
percent of the nations per capita GDP, making India one of the most generous exemptors 
in the world, since in most countries income tax becomes payable when one earns about 
one-half or one-fourth of the average national income. So while not entirely surprising, 
India sustains a political democracy without a commensurate fiscal democracy.   
The task of highlighting the contradictions within the political-economy of this 
nation, especially those relating to its poverty -- be that in its democratic politics or its 
economic laurels -- was undertaken not for its intellectual intrigue and appeal but in order 
put forth the following fundamental point about the Indian state: even though India often 
attracts generalizations and stereotyping, it also most often defies them. And why 
wouldn’t it, it is an enormous and varied land with a combined genetic, linguistic, socio-
economic, ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity that is unparalleled by any other 
nation. In fact, the probability of India’s inherent characteristics culminating in a ‘life of 
9 
 
contradictions’ was not entirely unexpected; we can turn to the prophetic words of  
Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who was a social reformer, Dalit leader and till date remains 
one of the most celebrated pioneers of the Indian National Movement. When 
disappointed by the Constituent Assembly’s lack of an official commitment to 
incorporate the term ‘Socialist’ in the Indian constitution, even after the Assembly 
acknowledged the imperative for redistribution, in his last speech before the them he 
argued:17  
On the 26th January 1950 [when the Constitution was to come into effect] we are 
going to enter a life of contradictions. In politics we will have equality and in 
social and economic life we will have inequality. In politics we will be 
recognizing the principle of one man, one vote, one value. In our social and 
economic life we shall, by reason of our social and economic structure, continue 
to deny the principle of one man, one value. How long shall we continue to live 
this life of contradictions? (Emphasis added) 
 
Many Indias within  
The following section elucidates the various dimensions along which India 
sustains its unparalleled diversity; building a foundation for the upcoming assessment of 
how the political-economic structures of the Indian state were formed and justified.  
Religion: India has remained a Hindu-majority state since independence, with 
about 79.8 percent Hindus, 14.2 percent Muslims, 2.3 Christians and 1.7 percent Sikhs in 
2011.18Even though less than 15 percent of Indians are Muslim, India is home to the 
second-largest Muslim population in the world, next only to Indonesia. It is the birthplace 
                                                
17 John Harris, “Politics and redistribution in India,” page 211, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics.27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 
2018.  
18 “C-1 Population By Religious Community.” Census of India Website: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, 
India, www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/c-01.html.  
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of four major religions: Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism and Buddhism.19  Zoroastrianism 
and Judaism also have an ancient history in India, each with several thousands of Indian 
adherents. India has the largest population of people adhering to Zoroastrianism (i.e. 
Parsis and Iranis) and Bahá'í Faith in the world, even though these religions are not native 
to India.20 Relating to religion is the caste system - one of the oldest hierarchies and a 
distinctive feature of Indian society - that is omnipresent and all-pervasive in the nation. 
The term ‘caste’ can be used to mean Varna or Jait. Varna refers to a segment of the 
four-fold division of Hindu society based on functional criterion, namely, Brahmins 
(scholars), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants/traders) and Sudras (labourers). 
There is a large sub-population that is completely excluded from the system, previously 
called Untouchables, but now largely referred to as Dalits. While the Indian state has 
worked to implement policies that reduce the disadvantages faced by ‘lower-castes,’ 
especially Sudras and Dalits, through reservations, caste continues to play a role in 
“shaping both economic and social transactions.”21 Jati refers to a hereditary endogamous 
status group practicing a specific traditional occupation. There are more than 3,000 jatis 
in India. These are hierarchically graded in different ways in different religions.22 The 
practice of caste system is not confined to Hindus alone. One can find castes among the 
Muslims, Christians, Sikhs as well as other communities. There is the hierarchy of Shaik, 
Saiyed, Mughal and Pathan among Muslims. Furthermore, there are castes like teli (oil 
presser), dhobi (washerman), etc. among the Muslims. Similarly, caste consciousness 
                                                
19 Daily Bhaskar, https://daily.bhaskar.com/news/NAT-TOP-india-cultural-religious-ethnic-diversity-4811522-PHO.html?ref=hf, 
Web. 23 Apr. 2018 
20 ibid 
21 Kumar, Sunil Mitra. “Does Caste Influence Access to Agricultural Loans in Rural India?”, 3 June 2013, 
www.ideasforindia.in/article.aspx?article=Does-caste-influence-access-to-agricultural-loans-in-rural-India. 
22 Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Jati." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 09 Mar. 2016. Web. 23 
Apr. 2018. 
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among the Christians in India is not unknown. Since a vast majority of Christians in India 
were converted from Hindu fold, the converts carried the caste system into Christianity. 
In this view, one can imagine the extent of caste diversity and social cleavages in India.23  
Ethnicity: There are many different ethnic groups who have migrated to India 
over the course of centuries. Anthropologists are indebted to Sir Herbert Risley for the 
elucidation of that most complex problem in ethnic classification, “The People of India”, 
where he notes seven racial types: (1) Turko – Iranian, (2) Indo-Aryan, (3) Scytho-
Dravidian, (4) Aryo-Dravidian, (5) Mongo-Dravidian, (6) Mongoloid and (7) Dravidians. 
These seven racial types can be reduced to three basic types – the Indo-Aryan, the 
Mongolian, the Dravidian. The vast population of India also consists of the jungle tribes 
like the Bhils, the Konds, the Santhals, the Jarawas, etc; with over 700 tribes that have 
been notified under Article 342 of the Constitution of India, classified as ‘Scheduled 
Tribes.’ The largest number of main tribal communities - 62 - has been specified in 
relation to the state of Orissa,24 with the majority living in the northeastern states of 
Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Nagaland. Smaller numbers inhabit the hills and 
forests of central and southern India as well as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.25 
Culture: There are close to 111 officially recognized dance forms in the country, 
with the likes of Bharatnatyam, Kathak, Kathakali, Kuchipudi, Manipuri, Mohiniattam 
and Odissi gaining a worldwide presence. Across India there are diverse folk dance forms 
such as Bhangra of Punjab, Yakshagana of Karnataka, Bihu of Assam and Chhau of 
                                                
23 "'In Spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India'." NPR. NPR, 03 Feb. 2007. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
24 "Tip | How Many 'Scheduled Tribes' Are There in India? And What Distinguishes Them from Other Communities? ('tribal' or 
Otherwise) – Information Provided by the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes." Tribal Cultural Heritage in India Foundation. 
N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
25 Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Adivasi." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 22 Dec. 2015. Web. 
23 Apr. 2018. 
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Jharkhand.26  Clothing styles vary based upon region, religion, geography, and climate, 
with Saree and dhoti being the main traditional dresses of India. In fact, there are close to 
80 recorded ways to tie a saree.27 There are numerous festivals celebrated throughout the 
year in relation to seasons, religions, myths; some are exclusive to certain communities 
and religions while others have a national and secular character about them. ‘Maha 
Kumbh Mela’ festival in Allahabad, where millions of Hindu devotees took a ‘holy dip’ 
in the Ganges, was so massive a gathering that is was visible from space in 2013 via 
satellite images.28  
Language: As mentioned earlier, India is one of the most multilingual places in 
the entire world - with more languages than those spoken in the entire Western 
Hemisphere. A majority of the 1632 listed languages classified as dialects, the Indian 
constitution officially recognizes 22 languages, of which Hindi and English are the most 
widely spoken and used to conduct official state business. The high number of Indian 
languages belong to five of the world's major language groups; Indo-European, 
Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic, Tibeto-Burmese and Semito-Hamitic. According to the New 
Delhi-based Indian Newspaper Society, India has 62,000 newspapers, with a staggering 
90 percent of them in local languages.29 KPMG in India and Google found that Indian-
language internet users numbered 234 million in 2016, far more than the 175 million 
English-language internet users and projected the former group to grow to 536 million by 
2021, far outpacing the growth rate foreseen for English-language internet users30 
                                                
26 "Folk Dances of India - Region & State Wise." Traditional Folk Dances of India - Regional & State Wise. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 
2018. 
27 "How to Wear a Sari in India." World Hum. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
28 "Kumbh Mela Festival." BBC News. BBC, 13 Feb. 2013. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
29 Asia-PacificIndia. "Medium for the Masses: How India's Local Newspapers Are Winning Rural Readers." Knowledge@Wharton. 
N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
30 "India's Internet Is Led by Local Languages, Not English." EMarketer. N.p., 12 July 2017. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
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Regions:  India has all types of physiographic regions, namely, the Northern 
Mountains, Indo Gangetic Plains, the Peninsular Plateau, Thar Desert, and the Coastal 
Plains. India is home to one of the wettest, coldest and most humid places in the world. 
This landscape is further augmented by island clusters in the form of The Andaman and 
Nicobar Islands and the Lakshadweep. In settlement patterns, the urban population makes 
up approximately 33.5 percent of the total population, meaning that over half the 
population lives in rural areas, where 80 percent of India’s poor live.31  The entire region 
of India has been territorially divided into subnational political units comprising 29 states 
and 7 union territories; the former being governed by state governments while the latter 
fall under the purview of the central government. This category of subnational political 
units, in the form of states, is arguably the most important dimension along which 
diversity within India is evident; especially because, as the next section will elucidate, 
these states were formed largely on the basis of groups that shared related cultures, 
specifically language. Thus, while these states capture much of the social diversity within 
India, they also add their own dimension of variation, and a rather important one, to the 
larger Indian context - that of state and local level politics and related matters like 
community mobilization and social movements, which directly influence developmental 
outcomes for the residents of these states. This is evident in Singh’s statement:32  
Indian states, the subnational political unit that is vested with constitutional 
authority over social policy vary greatly in the strength of the solidarity of their 
political community. These differences in subnationalism have played a critical 
role in generating differences in the progressiveness of social policy and levels of 
social development...in terms of the education and health of the population.  
 
                                                
31 "India's Poverty Profile." World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
32 Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge 
Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
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An example of such variation, as Forbes magazine notes, “[India’s] 36 states and 
union territories range from giant Uttar Pradesh with more than 200 million people to tiny 
island territories...with fewer than half a million....Uttar Pradesh and neighboring Bihar 
have a combined population roughly equal to that of the U.S., but a combined GDP less 
than that of Michigan.”33  
The aggregation of vastly different places, peoples, and societies, all united by 
one national identity in all their diversity, is followed by a statistical exercise in 
constructing averages, delivering to us singular facts on ‘India.’ The World Bank’s 
website information page on India first notes, “[a]ny effort to understand India must 
begin by acknowledging the existence of many Indias...well-being and prosperity vary 
widely across the country.”34  Our characterization of India as featured by conundrums 
and diversity can be seen most profoundly in the stark variation seen, in any given sphere 
of life (including and stemming from the several dimensions delineated above), within 
and across the nation’s various regions. This variation dictates that any fact or statistic 
which might best describe India entirely depends on what part of the country one is 
investigating. These differences are presented graphically by Prerna Singh:35 
While certain states have attained levels of social development, conceptualized in 
terms of the education and health of the population, approaching those enjoyed by 
middle-income, industrialized countries, other states have fared worse than 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In a country the demographic size of India, these 
divergences translate into dramatic differences in the quality of life for millions. 
In the 1950s, residents of Bihar (which has a larger population than France) were 
less than half as likely to be literate as people in Himachal Pradesh. In the 1970s, 
women in Orissa (which has a larger population than Argentina) were expected to 
                                                
33 Babones, Salvatore. "India May Be The World's Fastest Growing Economy, But Regional Disparity Is A Serious Challenge." 
Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Jan. 2018. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
34 "India States Briefs." World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
35 Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge 
Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
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live, on average, over twelve years less than women in Punjab. In the 1990s, 
children born in Madhya Pradesh (which has a population just a little lower than 
Turkey) were five times less likely to survive through infancy than those born in 
the state of Goa. Even today, women in Maharashtra (demographically equivalent 
to Mexico) are four times less likely to die during childbirth than their 
counterparts in Assam.  
 
This state-wise disparity clearly indicates that any worthwhile and informative 
assessment of the socio-economic developmental outcomes faced by the Indian 
population can only be truly understood via a disaggregated state-level analysis. The 
states are not only distinctive in their histories, peoples, and norms, but also in their social 
welfare policies, which are implemented at that state level, allowing for further deviations 
within the policy realm. As noted in the Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics, 
“[d]evelopmental performance of Indian states continues to diverge along several 
dimensions, including economic growth, distribution and poverty alleviation, and quality 
of governance. Why this should be so remains a complex, important, and under-
investigated area of research.”36  The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to conduct such a 
disaggregated analysis, in order to understand the true nature of poverty and deprivation 
across the different regions within the country. A subnational research design better 
equips us to handle the spatially uneven nature of processes such as social development.37  
A comparison of subnational units allows us to look beyond the common-place 
characterization of India as “backward,” by recognizing and evaluating different cases, 
with some achieving substantial development while others remain egregiously backward, 
by decomposing the variation that remains hidden by national characterizations and 
                                                
36  John Harris, “Politics and redistribution in India,” page 211, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics.27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 
2018 
37 Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge 
Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
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averages. This is disaggregated analysis is undertaken in the next chapter, which employs 
data analysis to discern state-level performance on poverty, health, and education 
outcomes for the Indian population by residence. Additionally, the question of who 
provides welfare in India provides further support for such a subnational research design. 
Article 246 of the Indian constitution divides policy areas among three lists – the Union, 
State, and Concurrent lists. The Union and State lists consist of subjects under the 
exclusive purview of the central and state governments respectively, while the 
Concurrent list is composed of subjects upon which both levels of government have 
jurisdiction. Health is on the state list. Education was shifted from the state list to the 
concurrent list by the 42nd Amendment in 1976. Institutionally, the primary 
responsibility for developmental policies has rested with states rather than the national 
government. States play the key role in the formulation and execution of policies 
regarding both education and health, and account for nearly 90 percent of total 
government expenditure on these issues.38  The importance of noting this institutional 
design can be seen in the following quote by a former education minister, who observed 
that prior to 1976, “[w]hether it was primary education or secondary education or 
university education, the states if they were so inclined, could do what they liked without 
the Center having any voice in the legislation they passed or in the administration of the 
system”39  On this account of institutional design, as well as the previously noted ‘Many 
Indias within’ section that outlined demographic variation throughout the country, arises 
                                                
38 Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Chapter 1, 
page 16, Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018  
39 Ibid, page 17  
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the need to clarify the exact nature of the Indian federation, which the following section 
will do.   
 
The Indian Federation: Unity in Diversity 
In India, the federal system emerged after Independence as a means of managing 
ethnic and linguistic diversity: demands for autonomy could be accommodated more 
easily than in a unitary structure like that of Sri Lanka. Indian states vary dramatically in 
their languages, social structures, economies, and party competition, and the federal 
system institutionalized these differences rather than attempting to homogenize them. 
This federal structure generally has been successful, particularly in mitigating linguistic 
conflict in south India in the 1950s and 1960s.40 
India can be classified as a ‘holding together’ federation, where the centre created 
the states as they came to be, unlike the U.S., where pre-existing states came together to 
form one nation. So how did India carve out its states? The central question through 
India’s freedom movement and post-independence nation building was how this fledgling 
democracy might be reconciled with its long-standing demographic diversity. Given that 
federalism is organized via territorial units, this question becomes even more specific in 
the context of center-state relations, whereby, India had to find a way to consolidate its 
geographically concentrated diversities with its national democratic experiment. Here, it 
is worth noting that India’s social and cultural diversities can be reduced to four main 
forms: caste, religion, language and tribe. Of these, language and tribe are territorially 
concentrated, making them the mainstay of Indian federalism. It is fortuitous that the 
                                                
40 Paul Staniland, “Insurgencies in India”, page 168, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics.27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 2018 
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Indian population is well-dispersed across the nation when viewed by religion, with the 
only notable exception being that of a Sikh concentration in Punjab, because the carnage 
brought on with the India-Pakistan partition served as sufficient warning of the 
communal-violence and instability religious identity in politics can bring. Religion came 
to be seen as India’s principal fault line, with the immediate post-independence 
leadership countering this by delegitimizing religion-based demands for states within the 
federation. We see this in the case of Punjab, where, demands for the state based on the 
distinctiveness of Sikhism with respect to Hinduism were rejected, but when proposed 
along linguistic arguments of Punjabi being different from Hindi, Haryana and Punjab 
were born as separate states, one Hindi speaking, the other Punjabi speaking.41 While 
religion is not privileged in politics, the Indian State ensures the protection of religious 
diversity by guaranteeing freedom of worship, separate ‘personal laws’ such as the 
religiously governed codes for property inheritance, divorce and marriage and privileges 
for minority educational institutions. Varshney notes:42  
After partition, religion could not be the basis of federal statehood, a principle 
followed consistently for the more than six decades of Indian democracy 
regardless of which party ruled in Delhi...language and tribe became the 
foundations of Indian federation—partly because of their geographical 
concentration, and in part because these two identities were not viewed as 
profound existential threats to India.  
 
Given this socio-politically acceptable mechanism of state-formation under 
India’s ‘holding together’ federal nature, Varshney investigates the question of what 
relationship this Indian federation shares with its nationhood. To answer this question, he 
                                                
41 How has Indian Federalism Done?, Studies in Indian Politics, 1, 1 (2013): 43–63  
42 ibid 
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evaluates the nature of Indian nationhood and argues that unlike France’s Nation-state 
type, which “essentially represents a coincidence of the territorial boundaries of a state 
and the cultural boundaries of a nation,” such that, this type of nationhood tends to be 
assimilationist in character, and focuses on the removal of ethnic or cultural diversities, 
India is a state-nation, which “consists of states that have strong cultural diversity, some 
of which is territorially based and can potentially create demands for independence.” 
State-nations, as defined by Varshney, function on two levels: (1) creating a sense of 
belonging to the larger political community  (in this case, India), (2) while 
simultaneously institutionalizing guarantees for safeguarding politically salient 
diversities, such as language, religion and culturally sacred norms.43 With territorially-
centered cultural differences, federalism allows the implementation of culturally 
respectful policies that also facilitate stability and unity. As such, “the concept of state-
nation is both about recognizing diversities and building larger all-India loyalties.” While 
it is certainly not an easy political undertaking to constructively encourage identification 
with one’s diverse subnational background simultaneous to a feeling of unity in being 
Indian, survey results from 2005 indicate that this process has been largely successful in 
India; with less than 12 percent of the 5385 survey respondents identifying solely with 
their state and over 66 percent identifying with both, India and their state.44 Thus, a 
commitment to the larger entity of India has been cultivated not by suppressing 
diversities, but by recognizing and supporting them. The basic idea of the federal bargain 
is that states will retain loyalty to India even while acting with significant autonomy 
                                                
43 ibid 
44 Ibid  
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within it. 45Additionally, an important facet of the success of Indian federalism, as 
constructed linguistically, is that Indian identities tend to crosscut as opposed to 
accumulate; such that, depending on where she lives, the first language of a Muslim 
could be Hindi, Urdu, Bengali or any of the many others, or that a south Indian Dalit 
shares little with a north Indian Dalit; and being a Brahmin in north India is very different 
from being one in south India. “When politics mixes with such a social landscape, 
political entrepreneurs mobilize their communities on a whole variety of issues, creating 
serious internal pluralism in state politics.”46 This allows for a remarkable fluidity in how 
and along what identity dimensions one might construct a majority-minority framework, 
giving Indian federalism a benign edge. 
Having clarified the exact nature of the Indian federation, we are better equipped to make 
a case for differences in subnationalism as an a plausible explanation for the variation in 
development outcomes experienced across the states, which will be undertaken in the 
following chapters.. We can turn to Prerna Singh’s definition of Subnationationalism:47  
[Subantionationalism is] the identification with, or aspiration for, a self-governing 
homeland located within the boundaries of a sovereign country.The ideology and 
movement of subnationalism incorporate both cultural and political dimensions – 
people with a belief in a shared past and a common culture, based often but not 
necessarily on language, who identify with, or desire the creation of and control 
over, a political-administrative unit within a sovereign country that corresponds to 
a territory they believe belonged to their forebears.  
 
The foremost characteristic of subnationalism is its association with political self-
determination. Unlike any other category of identity, be it race, gender, religion or class, 
subnationalism demands self-determination based on what is seen as one’s historic 
                                                
45 “Paul Staniland, “Insurgencies in India”, Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics.27 Dec. 2012. Web. 23 Apr. 2018 
46 Ibid, page 57  
47 Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Chapter 1, 
page 16, Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018 
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culture, group and homeland, while unlike nationalism, it is about political-administration 
within a larger sovereign entity that subnationals simultaneously identify with. While 
identity politics has a long-standing history of destructive outcomes, as related to 
chauvinism, xenophobia, and violence, the limited institutional scope of subnationalism, 
whereby it does not demand sovereignty or dissociation with the larger uniting entity, in 
this case being Indian, is actually an important factor in making subnationalism and state-
identity a constructive force that leads to social cohesion, which can lead to the 
materialization of public goods that are beneficial to all. While a large body of 
development literature is conclusive in noting top-down State intervention as the prime 
mechanism for provision of public goods, it is argued here that differences in societal 
action demanding such provisions can be a key variable in influencing the State’s 
decision to prioritize the implementation these services. Indian states are in charge of 
administering a large list of subjects, which largely scope matters that directly impact 
everyday lives of their residents, and thus are also the ones most personal to citizens. 
Managing 61 items on the ‘State list’ as well as co-managing 52 items on the ‘Concurrent 
list’48means that levels of social mobilization can prove to be instrumental in influencing 
how states decide to allocate their limited resources among competing items on their list 
and what items end up making it to a government's curated policy agenda.  
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Chapter Two: Data Analysis 
 
This chapter undertakes state-level data analysis on outcomes achieved in health, 
education, and poverty by the Indian states, to discern which states have performed better 
or worse than expected of them.  
 
Need for government intervention  
 
Public welfare economics cites two main reasons for government intervention in 
the economy: market failure and redistribution. Intervention for human development can 
be justified on both these fronts: an inefficient market system that is unable to allocate 
resources to their best use leads to high levels of poverty, such that, if the markets were 
well-functioning, outcomes would be surplus maximizing. Poverty is not a best outcome 
as it is characterized by low demand for goods and services, consequently lowering their 
supply and preventing further growth and augmentation of the economy. Additionally, 
poverty itself is inefficient since it wastes a crucial economic resource: potential human 
capital. Poverty also creates a self-explanatory need for redistribution of resources. Thus, 
without a doubt, the government has a strong imperative to reduce poverty, and it must 
use policy and regulation to this end. We therefore need to identify factors are effective to 
this end.  
Additionally, poverty alleviation in India is not only a moral imperative but also 
an economic and political one. India has been lauded as one of the fastest growing 
economies with a massive demographic dividend. But mass poverty is simply inefficient 
– it is a waste of India’s human capital. Thus, for true economic efficiency, poverty 
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alleviation is needed. India is also the world’s largest democracy. While we can turn to 
scholars like Przeworski who categorically defines democratic systems as based foremost 
in equality before law, without any other qualifying factors since democratic outcomes 
are inherently uncertain. Yet, the heart of India’s constitution is embodied in the 
preamble, which states that India is a “Sovereign, Socialist, Secular and Democratic 
Republic.” This clearly indicates a certain public commitment toward general welfare; 
and as a representative democracy, India must provide better outcomes in the interest of 
those whose name it governs in.  
 
Need to go beyond poverty: A Human Development approach 
India’s poverty reduction since 2005 has given cause to celebrate – a report by 
McKinsey49 notes that the share of the population below the official poverty line fell from 
37 percent in 2005 to 22 percent in 2012—the fastest rate of poverty reduction India has 
achieved since the economic reforms of the early 1990s—as an impressive 137 million 
people rose above this threshold. But above it looms a hard question: is ending extreme 
poverty enough to achieve a decent standard of living and sense of dignity for the poor? 
India’s human development indicators show that deprivation extends well beyond the 22 
percent of Indian who live below the official poverty line. Forty percent of the nation’s 
children under the age of 3 suffer from malnutrition. Fifty percent of its households have 
no access to improved sanitation facilities. Seventy percent of those between the ages of 
15 and 65 have only a primary school education—or no education at all. These statistics 
are symptomatic of the broader issue of poor living standards experienced by a 
                                                
49 Gupta, Rajat, Shirish Sankhe, Richard Dobbs, Jonathan Woetzel, Anu Madgavkar, and Ashwin Hasyagar. "India's Path from 
Poverty to Empowerment." McKinsey & Company. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
24 
 
significant portion of India’s population. On this account, we turn to the concept of 
human development, which is defined as a process of enlarging people's choices to lead a 
long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and be educated, and to have access to 
resources needed for a decent level of living.50 
 
Need for state-wise assessment  
While poverty alleviation has undoubtedly been a top agenda for several 
successive central governments, understanding growth and development in India requires 
a state-wise assessment. India is large and diverse, comprising numerous states and their 
own societies within. The federal structure provides not only a more efficient 
administration of the vast territory and populace but also serves to better represent the 
diverse communities within India. Growing interregional disparities strongly support the 
assumption of varying socio-economic conditions between states. Additionally, the 
development indicators we are concerned with, namely health, education, and poverty, 
are matters that fall under the state and concurrent list according to the constitution of 
India, thereby allowing variations in our outcomes of interest based on the particular state 
and conditions prevalent within.  
States in India perform differently on socio-economic outcomes. Some of this 
difference may arise from aspects that state policy does not and cannot directly influence, 
while others arise due to differences in policies, their implementation, and consequent 
impact. We want to discern what impacts policy agendas adopted by a state, to learn how 
one might better orient policy toward development. In order to do this, we must identify 
                                                
50 Ghosh, Madhusudan. "Economic Growth and Human Development in Indian States." Economic and Political Weekly. N.p., 29 July 
2006. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
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the states that have performed well due to their policies; or the states that have performed 
differently than what would be expected based on their given resource endowment and 
prevailing conditions. Let me explain this with the following analogy: My father’s 
completion of his bachelor’s degree is far superior a success than my completion of my 
bachelor's degree. His childhood featured financial insecurity in a small town, while mine 
did not. He started off with few resources. Given his initial endowment of resources, 
access, network, social capital, and all other relevant factors, he performed exceedingly 
better than the level of education and success that was expected of him. On the other 
hand, my initial endowment of resources, access, network, social capital, and all other 
relevant factors, was substantially higher than his endowment when he was 18. Thus, 
even though both of us have completed a bachelor’s degree, our level of success, and the 
inputs that went into this success, are not the same! He performed better than what was 
expected of him, whereas I have performed well within the expectations of someone who 
is endowed with my resources. It is therefore far more interesting to investigate what 
factors made him complete his bachelor’s degree instead of the factors that made me 
complete mine, even though the outcome of receiving a college degree was the same.  
 
Empirical model  
In order to determine which states have performed outside of their expected 
levels, this thesis uses regression analysis to determine what the expected or predicted 
level of performance for a state is based on its endowments. Using state level data, this 
econometric model estimates the level of achievement in the human development 
indicators under consideration: poverty, health, and education. Thereafter, the predicted 
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level is compared with the states actual achievement on these indicators, to determine 
which states have outperformed and which have underperformed, and accordingly rank 
them. This thesis thereafter undertakes case study analysis of the best and worst 
performing states, to delineate the most crucial factors that influenced their performance.   
  
Outcome of Interest: Poverty  
To estimate a state’s predicted level of poverty, this thesis controls for the states 
net state domestic product per citizen (NSDP per capita), Median years of schooling in 
the population, and the proportion of its socio-economically disadvantaged population 
(ST and SC population.) NSDP per capita is an indicator of how wealthy a state is, and 
therefore, what level of resources it might be endowed with as well as how well-off its 
residents might be. Median years of schooling accounts for human capital development 
that could influence returns to labor.   Proportion of ST/SC population indicates the level 
of systematic disadvantage that this group of the state’s populace faces. The first two 
covariates allow us to control of wealth and the third covariate allows us to control of 
discrimination, such that, the regression model is now able to estimate what level of 
poverty the state should have, given its endowment of wealth, human capital and 
disadvantaged peoples. In essence, we can no longer attribute higher levels of poverty 
than those predicted, to the states lack of wealth or high prevalence of disadvantaged 
groups, and vice versa. This helps us expand our investigation of factors relevant to 
poverty and its alleviation, beyond the non-policy variables like the state’s wealth and 
social composition, to other factors, specifically the ones that are policy-variables.   
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Another covariate considered for this model was the proportion of rural 
population, since 80 percent of the poor live in rural India.51 In rural areas, less than 5 
percent earn enough to pay taxes, only 2.5 percent own a four-wheeler vehicle and less 
than 10 percent have salaried jobs.52 However, due to high correlation between 
percentage of rural population and NSDP per capita, the author dropped the former as an 
explanatory covariate.  
Model:  
γ = β0 + β1 (Median schooling) + β2 (log NSDP per capita) + β3 (ST/SC %)   
 
Outcome of Interest: Health  
An overarching health outcome indicator not only measures the performance of the 
health sector but is also closely linked to other development processes, as health is 
closely linked to economic, social, and environmental factors.53 This thesis uses two 
measures to account for the standard of health in a state: life expectancy at birth and 
infant mortality rate. 
1) Life Expectancy  
Life expectancy is perhaps the most important measure of health. It is readily 
comparable across states and asks the most fundamental question concerning health: how 
long can the typical person expect to live? Life expectancy increases due to healthcare 
improvements like the introduction of vaccines, the development of drugs or positive 
behavior changes like the reduction in smoking or drinking rates. Life expectancy at birth 
                                                
51 "India's Poverty Profile." World Bank. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
52 Katyal, Ritika. "India Census Shows Extent of Poverty." CNN. Cable News Network, 03 Aug. 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 2018. 
53 An overarching health indicator for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, WHO, web, 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/indicators/hsi_indicators_SDG_TechnicalMeeting_December2015_BackgroundPaper.pdf  
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is a summary indicator of mortality conditions and, by proxy, of health conditions. It 
summarizes mortality risks and trends across all age groups, including older people. This 
measure, however, does not directly address non-fatal health outcomes, disability etc. 
except through the proxy of mortality risks. “The justification of life expectancy at birth 
in representing the health dimension is on the grounds of intrinsic value of longevity, 
association of long life with adequate nutrition, good health and education and its 
linkages with other valued goals” 54 
To estimate a state’s predicted life expectancy, this thesis controls for the states 
proportion of rural population (percent rural), median years of schooling (median 
schooling), proportion of the state’s population that falls in the highest wealth quintile 
nationally (fifth wealth quintile), proportion of it socioeconomically disadvantaged 
population (ST/SC percent). The rationale of controlling for rural population and highest 
wealth quintile is to control for wealth resources. Median years of schooling accounts for 
the likely impact on health due to returns on education that allow one to maintain better 
health. ST/SC population as mentioned previously controls for disadvantaged groups. 
Additionally, all these covariates also capture a sense of the proportion of population that 
likely have and likely do not have resources to enhance their health outcomes. As 
mentioned above, life expectancy is a function of factors beyond healthcare, including 
socioeconomic and environmental conditions. Therefore, controlling for poverty rate and 
proportion in the highest wealth quintile allows us to put forth a reasonable prediction of 
the level of life expectancy, while being able to investigate reasons beyond these when 
assessing differences in the actual achievements.  
                                                
54 Ibid  
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Model: 
γ = β0 + β1 (Median schooling) + β2 (Highest wealth quintile) + β3 (ST/SC %) + β4 
(Percent rural)  
 
2) Infant mortality rate  
The infant mortality rate (IMR), defined as the number of deaths in children under 
1 year of age per 1000 live births in the same year, has in the past been regarded as a 
highly sensitive (proxy) measure of population health. This reflects the apparent 
association between the causes of infant mortality and other factors that are likely to 
influence the health status of whole populations such as their economic development, 
general living conditions, social wellbeing, rates of illness, and the quality of the 
environment.55 Factors that directly impact infant mortality include the mother’s prenatal 
health status, both their access to healthcare facilities, environmental conditions, and 
socioeconomic status. IMR is internationally recognized as a measure of health as well as 
a robust proxy for relevant factors that impact the overall structure of health in a state. 
Therefore, therefore, this thesis uses IMR to capture these conditions.  
To estimate a state’s predicted infant mortality rate, this thesis controls for the 
states net state domestic product per citizen (NSDP per capita), proportion of the state’s 
population that falls in the lowest wealth quintile nationally (first wealth quintile), the 
number of females for every 1000 males (Sex ratio), and the median years of schooling 
attained by the population aged 6 and over (median years of schooling.) The rationale for 
controlling for NSDP per capita as well as lowest wealth quintile remains the same as 
                                                
55  Goel MK, Roy P, Rasania SK, Roy S, Kumar Y, Kumar A. Wealth index and maternal health care: Revisiting NFHS-3. Indian J 
Public Health 2015;59:217-9. 
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noted in previous sections. The author controls for the sex ratio of a state because of the 
long-standing history of gender discrimination in many regions of India, as made 
colloquially popular by Amartya Sen’s “100 Million Missing Women” article, which 
notes how over 100 million more women should be alive in Asia and Africa according to 
normal biological birth rates, but gender selective abortion, female infanticide, and 
overall neglect of women’s health have led to skewed demographics. He states:56  
In view of the enormity of the problems of women’s survival in large parts of 
Asia and Africa, it is surprising that these disadvantages have received such 
inadequate attention. The numbers of “missing women” in relation to the numbers 
that could be expected if men and women received similar care in health, 
medicine, and nutrition, are remarkably large. A great many more than a hundred 
million women are simply not there because women are neglected compared with 
men.  
 
Infant mortality rates would relate to the sex ratio not only directly via female 
infanticide, but also indirectly in that states with higher females are likely to provide 
better healthcare for females overall, reducing the likelihood of high IMR. The author 
controls for median years of schooling in a state because better education likely translates 
to better health choices, thoughtful family planning, and overall information access for 
the population, reducing the probability of high IMR.  
Another covariate considered for this model was the average BMI of women, 
which the author found to be statistically significant in its impact on IMR. However, 
since women’s nutrition can be influenced directly via policy intervention, the author 
dropped this as a control variable to predict expected IMR. The author also considered 
including poverty rate or rural population, but NSDP per capita sufficiently captured the 
                                                
56 Sen, Amartya. "More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing." The New York Review of Books. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2018.  
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resource conditions of a state so the author did not include these unnecessary and highly 
correlated variables in the model, to avoid issues of multicollinearity.  
Model:  
γ = β0 + β1 (Log NDSP per capita) + β2 (Sex ratio) + β3 (Lowest wealth quintile) + β4 
(Median schooling)  
 
Outcome of Interest: Education 
To estimate a state’s predicted education level, the author employs enrollment in 
higher secondary school (XI and XII grade) as the dependent variable. While the author 
also considers overall attendance rates in schools as well as median years of schooling of 
the population as potential dependent variables, the foremost outcome of interest is 
determined to be higher secondary enrollment. This is because attendance does not 
necessarily indicate learning and is also easily misreported, while median years of 
schooling in the population is a function of conditions prevalent over the last decade and 
more, not informing us much about current conditions of education in the state. Thus, 
enrollment in higher secondary school is found to be the best indicator of the status of 
education in a state, because to be eligible for enrollment in XIth and XIIth grades, one 
must pass exit exams for all previous grades, which likely indicates true learning. 
Additionally, higher secondary schooling is not covered under the Right to Education 
Act, allowing this to be a non-policy variable. Students who are enrolled in higher 
secondary have passed all previous grades and opted into pursuing their education 
further, without the law requiring them to do so, indicating a private value their families 
find in their education. 
32 
 
The model used to predict a state’s higher secondary gross enrollment rate 
(HSGER), the author controls for the median years of schooling attained by the 
population aged 6 and over (median years of schooling), and proportion of the state’s 
population that falls in the highest wealth quintile nationally (fifth wealth quintile), the 
proportion of ST/SC population (ST/SC percent) and proportion of agriculture and allied 
sector contribution to the state gross domestic product (Agriculture in GDP). The author 
controls for median years of schooling because better educated parents are likely to better 
educate their children, and pursuing higher secondary education is a choice that families 
make, often contemplating between sending their grown up children to earn wages or to 
earn a high school diploma. Median years of schooling captures families that recognize 
the value of schooling. Controlling for the highest wealth quintile accounts for families 
who are able to afford not only foregoing any wages their children can earn but also the 
costs of their higher education.  ST/SC proportion controls for the disadvantaged groups 
that historically have lower educational rates as well. Agriculture contribution to state 
GDP attempts to capture the likelihood of someone attending school given the prevalence 
of farm employment.  
When investigating attendance as the dependent variable, the author found 
poverty rate and stunting rate of children below five years of age statistically significant 
in explaining attendance rates. When investigating median years of schooling, the author 
found poverty rate and proportion in highest wealth quintile statistically significant in 
explaining variation in this dependent variable across states.  
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Model:  
γ = β0 + β1 (Median schooling) + β2 (Highest wealth quintile) + β3 (ST/SC percent) + β4 
(Agriculture in state GDP) 
 
About the data  
The data used for this thesis’ regression analysis has been obtained from state and 
central government open data sources, as well as the National Family Health Survey 
2015-16. The following table lists the variables considered along with the corresponding 
source, time period, relevant summary statistics, and particular notes if applicable. 
Only major states have been accounted for, therefore, union territories of 
Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, Puducherry, 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands have been left out. This was done primarily because union 
territories are governed by the central government, and therefore would not inform our 
state-wise analysis much, while adding noise to the dataset. Telangana has been collapsed 
into Andhra Pradesh as much of the data used is from 2011, whilst Telangana was 
declared the 29th State of India in 2014.57  
 
Variable  Period  Source Notes 
Poverty Rate 2011 
 
Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation, 
Central Statistics Office, 
Social Statistics Division.  
September 2017 
Government of India 
www.mospi.gov.in 
Proportion of 
population below the 
State Poverty Line  
  
                                                
57 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/The-story-of-Indias-29th-State-%E2%80%94-Telangana/article14384461.ece 
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Each State has a poverty line calculate calculated by the Suresh Tendulkar committee method.  
Per Capita NSDP at 
2004-05 prices (Rs.)
   
Annual/
2012-13  
Selected Socioeconomic indicators 
2017, Central Statistics Office, 
Government of India 
data.gov.in 
Log transformed by 
author 
 
 
Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) is defined as a measure, in monetary terms, of the volume 
of all goods and services produced within the boundaries of the State during a given period of 
time after deducting the wear and tear or depreciation, accounted without duplication. Divided 
by the total population of State to give Per Capita data. 
Scheduled Tribe and 
Scheduled Caste 
Population  
2011 
 
Selected Socioeconomic indicators 
2017, Central Statistics Office, 
Government of India 
data.gov.in 
 
Combined ST and SC 
population 
proportions 
 
 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are among the most disadvantaged socio-
economic groups in India.  
SexRatioFemales100
0Males 
2011/ 
Decadal  
Census - Selected Socioeconomic 
indicators 2017, Central Statistics 
Office, Government of India 
data.gov.in 
 
Number of females per 1000 males, according to state 
 
First Wealth Quintile 2015-16 National Family and Health 
Survey, 2015-16 
 
Percent distribution of the de jure population in lowest wealth quintile discerned at a national 
average, according to residence and state, India, 2015-16 
Fifth Wealth Quintile 2015-16 National Family and Health 
Survey, 2015-16 
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Percent distribution of the de jure population in highest wealth quintile as discerned at a 
national average, according to residence and state, India, 2015-16 
Attendance 2015-16 National Family and Health 
Survey, 2015-16 
 
Percentage of de facto household population age 6-17 years attending school (including pre-
primary school) in 2015-16 school year according to state, India, 2015-16 
Higher Secondary 
Enrollment  
2015-16  
Ministry of Human Resource 
Development 
https://data.gov.in/resources/gross-
enrolment-ratio-2013-14-2015-16  
  
Total enrolment in a Higher Secondary (Grades XI and XII) level of education, regardless of 
age, expressed as a percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding to 
the same level of education in a given school-year. 
 
School-age Population: Population of the age group which officially corresponds to the 
relevant level of education. 
Median Years of 
Schooling 
2015-16 National Family and Health 
Survey, 2015-16 
*Author has 
calculated the 
population median as 
an average of Male 
and Female median 
years of schooling  
 
Percent distribution of the de facto female and male household populations age six and over by 
highest number of years of schooling completed and median number of years of schooling 
completed, according to state, India, 2015-16 
Infant Mortality 2015-16 National Family and Health 
Survey, 2015-16 
Infant mortality rates 
for the five-year 
period preceding the 
survey, by state/union 
territory, India, 2015-
16 
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Infant mortality: The probability of dying between birth and the first birthday. 
Life Expectancy 2010-14 Human Development Index 
Report, United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) 
India and Sample Registration 
Survey (SRS) based life table 
2010-14. 
 
https://www.disabled-
world.com/calculators-charts/in-
lifespan.php  
Due to lack of data, 
the author has used 
the life expectancy of 
Assam for Arunachal 
Pradesh, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, Sikkim, 
Tripura, and of 
Maharashtra for Goa.  
 
Life Expectancy: the average number of years a person is expected to live on the basis of the 
current mortality rates and prevalence distribution of health states in a population 
Stunting 2015-16 National Family and Health 
Survey, 2015-16 
 
 
Height-for-age is a measure of linear growth retardation and cumulative growth deficits. 
Children whose height-for-age Z-score is below minus two standard deviations (-2 SD) from 
the median of the reference population are considered short for their age (stunted), or 
chronically undernourished. Children who are below minus three standard deviations (-3 SD) 
are considered severely stunted. 
 
Sample:  Children under age five years 
 
 
 
Indicator Variable  Dropped  
Poverty  Log NSDP 
ST/SC 
Median years of schooling 
Rural population (collinear)  
Life expectancy  Median years of schooling 
Rural population  
Highest wealth quintile  
ST/SC 
Log NSDP 
Poverty rate 
IMR  Sex Ratio, Females per 1000 Males 
First wealth quintile  
Log NSDP 
BMI   
Gender gap in literacy  
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Median years of schooling 
HSGER  Median years of schooling 
Highest wealth quintile 
ST/SC  
Agriculture proportion in state GDP 
Stunting  
Rural population  
Log NSDP 
 
 
Empirical results  
 
The states’ predicted levels are estimated using beta coefficients determined by 
Model #1 for each indicator. The other models are provided as supporting evidence for 
the nature, direction, and significance of the relevant covariates to the outcome of 
interest.  
Based on the following results, the author investigates the cases of Kerala and 
Uttar Pradesh in the following chapters to explain how degrees of subnationalism 
influenced developmental outcomes experienced in these states, as supported by the 
following results. Subnationalism did so foremost by impacting the degree of government 
prioritization of social services in their policy agendas. While itself not a direct policy 
variable, subnationalism solidarity has been identified and argued as the primary 
determinant of socially oriented policy choices.  
  
POVERTY 
  
Model #1 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.5220 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
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Median years of schooling -.30829 1.509174 -0.20 0.840   
Log of NSDP per capita -15.13631 4.112619 -3.68 0.001   
Proportion of Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe 
.0467189 .0645029 0.72 0.476   
Constant 180.1114 37.62311 4.79 0.000   
Model #2 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3139 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Median years of schooling -4.468123 1.202378 -3.72 0.001   
Constant 46.13555 7.390826 6.24 0.000   
Model #3 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.5220 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Log of NSDP per capita -16.03139 2.724235 -5.88 0.000   
Constant 189.592 28.9537 6.55 0.000   
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  State Predicted level 
of poverty 
Actual 
Level of 
Poverty 
Difference Ranking In order of 
Ranking 
1 
  Andhra Pradesh 
17.69411519 9.2 8.494115193 4 
Meghalaya 
2 
  Arunachal Pradesh 
23.67354103 34.7 -11.02645897 28 
J & K 
3 Assam 27.30113321 32 -4.698866787 20 Rajasthan 
4 
Bihar 
35.49026341 33.7 1.790263408 12 Andhra 
Pradesh 
5 Chhattisgarh 25.9149691 39.9 -13.9850309 29 Punjab 
6 Delhi 2.025217213 9.9 -7.874782787 25 Himachal 
7 Goa -0.263819296 5.1 -5.363819296 22 Tripura 
8 Gujarat 12.60028845 16.6 -3.999711551 19 Kerala 
9 Haryana 11.89554791 11.2 0.695547914 16 Uttarakhand 
10 Himachal 14.74862348 8.1 6.648623475 6 West Bengal 
11 J & K 23.14006673 10.3 12.84006673 2 Mizoram 
12 Jharkhand 26.36537373 37 -10.63462627 27 Bihar 
13 Karnataka 18.13070318 20.9 -2.769296824 18 Tamil Nadu 
14 Kerala 12.38364163 7.1 5.28364163 8 Uttar Pradesh 
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15 Madhya 
Pradesh 
26.83534831 31.6 -4.764651694 21 
Sikkim 
16 Maharashtra 11.68045683 17.4 -5.719543172 24 Haryana 
17 Manipur 27.88558158 36.9 -9.014418423 26 Nagaland 
18 Meghalaya 25.05846257 11.9 13.15846257 1 Karnataka 
19 Mizoram 22.42196335 20.4 2.021963354 11 Gujarat 
20 Nagaland 19.50336564 18.9 0.603365636 17 Assam 
21 
Odisha 
27.04368602 32.6 -5.556313981 23 Madhya 
Pradesh 
22 
Punjab 
16.5626001 8.3 8.262600098 5 
Goa 
23 Rajasthan 24.78546692 14.7 10.08546692 3 Odisha 
24 Sikkim 9.585137955 8.2 1.385137955 15 Maharashtra 
25 Tamil Nadu 13.08994633 11.3 1.789946329 13 Delhi 
26 Tripura 19.36977233 14 5.369772331 7 Manipur 
27 Uttar Pradesh 31.10494871 29.4 1.704948711 14 Jharkhand 
28 
Uttarakhand 
14.31379652 11.3 3.013796519 9 Arunachal 
Pradesh 
29 West Bengal 22.26027317 20 2.260273167 10 Chhattisgarh 
  
HEALTH   
LIFE EXPECTANCY 
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Model #1 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.6785 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Median years of schooling in 
the population 
(median schooling) 
-.0921349 .0446325 -2.06 0.050   
Proportion in highest Wealth 
Quintile (fifth) 
.0681497 .0399244 1.71 0.101   
Proportion of Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe (ST/SC) 
-.0703211 .0178652 -3.94 0.001   
Proportion of Rural Population 
(percent rural) 
-.0142088 .0320897 -0.44 0.662   
Constant 71.74862 3.350907 21.41 0.000   
Model #2 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3468 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Proportion of Population under 
Poverty line (poverty rate) 
-.1969323 .0494441 -3.98 0.000   
Constant 71.63773 1.098029 65.24 0.000   
Model #3 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.4837 
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Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Proportion in highest Wealth 
Quintile (fifth) 
.1489702 .0285477 5.22 0.000   
Constant 64.42406 .8053191 80.00 0.000   
Model #4 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3766 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Proportion of Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe (ST/SC) 
-.0977155 .0230847 -4.23 0.000   
Constant 71.63017 1.041116 68.80 0.000   
Model #5 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2165 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Proportion of Rural Population 
(percent rural) 
-.1006821 .034062 -2.96 0.006   
Constant 74.56491 2.356649 31.64 0.000   
Model #6 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.6776 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
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Proportion of Population under 
Poverty line (poverty rate) 
-.1020646 .0539792 -1.89 0.071   
Proportion in highest Wealth 
Quintile (fifth) 
.085508 .0343441 2.49 0.020   
Proportion of Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe (ST/SC) 
-.0678928 .0179757 -3.78 0.001   
Log of NSDP per capita -.4540496 1.275278 -0.36 0.725   
Constant 75.31912 13.73149 5.49 0.000   
Model #6 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2343 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Log of NSDP per capita 3.541042 1.14488 3.09 0.005   
Constant 30.22493 12.168 2.48 0.019   
  
  
  
  
  State Predicted 
level of 
Life 
expectancy 
Actual 
Level of 
Life 
expectancy 
Difference Ranking In order of 
Ranking 
1 
  Andhra Pradesh 69.8 68.5 -1.34 
14 
Kerala 
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2 
  Arunachal Pradesh 65.2 63.9 -1.34 
15 
J & K 
3 Assam 68.8 63.9 -4.93 28 West Bengal 
4 
Bihar 68.8 68.1 -0.68 
12 
Himachal 
5 Chhattisgarh 67.9 64.8 -3.10 24 Maharashtra 
6 Delhi 73.1 73.2 0.06 8 Uttarakhand 
7 
Goa 73.2 71.6 -1.65 
18 
Tamil Nadu 
8 
Gujarat 70.6 68.7 -1.89 
20 
Delhi 
9 Haryana 71.4 68.6 -2.77 22 Punjab 
10 Himachal 69.9 71.6 1.65 4 Meghalaya 
11 J & K 70.6 72.6 1.97 2 Nagaland 
12 Jharkhand 68.0 66.6 -1.37 16 Bihar 
13 
Karnataka 69.6 68.8 -0.81 
13 
Karnataka 
14 
Kerala 72.7 74.9 2.21 
1 Andhra 
Pradesh 
15 Madhya 
Pradesh 68.7 64.2 -4.50 
27 Arunachal 
Pradesh 
16 Maharashtra 70.1 71.6 1.49 5 Jharkhand 
17 Manipur 68.2 63.9 -4.25 26 Rajasthan 
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18 Meghalaya 64.2 63.9 -0.31 10 Goa 
19 Mizoram 65.8 63.9 -1.93 21 Odisha 
20 Nagaland 64.3 63.9 -0.36 11 Gujarat 
21 Odisha 67.6 65.8 -1.75 19 Mizoram 
22 
Punjab 71.7 71.6 -0.09 
9 
Haryana 
23 Rajasthan 69.3 67.7 -1.57 17 Tripura 
24 Sikkim 67.9 63.9 -4.01 25 Chhattisgarh 
25 Tamil Nadu 69.8 70.6 0.78 7 Sikkim 
26 Tripura 66.9 63.9 -3.02 23 Manipur 
27 
Uttar Pradesh 69.5 64.1 -5.38 
29 Madhya 
Pradesh 
28 Uttarakhand 70.3 71.7 1.36 6 Assam 
29 West Bengal 68.5 70.2 1.71 3 Uttar Pradesh 
 
INFANT MORTALITY RATE 
  
Model #1 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3043 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Log of NSDP Per Capita -3.801679 6.261192 -0.61 0.549   
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Number of Females per 1000 
Males (Sex Ratio) 
-.0687359 .0452278 -1.52 0.142   
Proportion in lowest Wealth 
Quintile (first) 
.0990328 .2369562 0.42 0.680   
Median years of schooling in 
the population 
(median schooling) 
-2.507994 2.465018 -1.02 0.319   
Constant 152.0434 84.6979 1.80 0.085   
Model #2 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.1855 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Log of NSDP Per Capita -10.56806 3.891327 -2.72 0.011   
Constant 145.1441 41.35778 3.51 0.002   
Model #3 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3001 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Number of Females per 1000 
Males (Sex Ratio) 
-.0795238 .0409323 -1.94 0.063   
Proportion in lowest Wealth 
Quintile (first) 
.3941964 .1246309 3.16 0.004   
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Constant 102.4835 38.95497 2.63 0.014   
Model #4 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.3175 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Median years of schooling in 
the population 
(median schooling) 
-4.790766 1.279352 -3.74 0.001   
Constant 61.61785 7.863972 7.84 0.000   
Model #5 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.4083 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value   
Mean BMI Females (BMI) -6.947839 2.308971 -3.01 0.006   
Difference between Male and 
Female literacy (Gender Gap in 
Literacy rate) 
.4913041 .338421 1.45 0.159   
Proportion of Females who 
own Land (Female Land) 
-.1085962 .1699013 -0.64 0.529   
Constant 183.1332 56.12148 3.26 0.003   
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  State Predicted 
level of 
IMR 
Actual 
Level of 
IMR 
Difference Ranking In order of 
Ranking 
1 
  Andhra Pradesh 30.7 31.3 -0.625 
18 Arunachal 
Pradesh 
2 
  Arunachal Pradesh 38.1 22.9 15.186 
1 
West Bengal 
3 Assam 37.4 47.6 -10.246 25 Kerala 
4 
Bihar 50.9 48.1 2.795 
14 
Goa 
5 Chhattisgarh 35.2 38.3 -3.089 22 Manipur 
6 Delhi 27.7 31.2 -3.531 23 Maharashtra 
7 
Goa 19.9 12.9 7.026 
4 
Tripura 
8 
Gujarat 32.6 34.2 -1.635 
20 
J & K 
9 Haryana 33.6 32.8 0.756 16 Meghalaya 
10 
Himachal 24.7 34.3 -9.569 
24 
Nagaland 
11 J & K 36.9 32.4 4.531 19 Tamil Nadu 
12 Jharkhand 42.6 43.8 -1.193 16 Karnataka 
13 
Karnataka 30.5 26.9 3.586 
12 
Sikkim 
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14 Kerala 13.8 5.6 8.215 3 Bihar 
15 Madhya 
Pradesh 40.7 51.2 -10.508 
26 
Punjab 
16 Maharashtra 29.3 23.7 5.606 6 Haryana 
17 Manipur 27.9 21.7 6.238 5 Rajasthan 
18 Meghalaya 34.3 29.9 4.389 9 Andhra Pradesh 
19 
Mizoram 28.4 40.1 -11.660 
28 
Jharkhand 
20 Nagaland 33.3 29.5 3.829 10 Gujarat 
21 Odisha 37.3 39.6 -2.302 21 Odisha 
22 
Punjab 31.7 29.2 2.507 
15 
Chhattisgarh 
23 
Rajasthan 40.9 41.3 -0.377 
17 
Delhi 
24 Sikkim 32.4 29.5 2.908 13 Himachal 
25 Tamil Nadu 24.0 20.2 3.809 11 Assam 
26 
Tripura 31.3 26.7 4.636 
7 Madhya 
Pradesh 
27 
Uttar Pradesh 43.7 63.5 -19.779 
29 
Uttarakhand 
28 
Uttarakhand 29.1 39.7 -10.573 
27 
Mizoram 
29 West Bengal 36.6 27.5 9.070 2 Uttar Pradesh 
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EDUCATION 
 
HIGHER SECONDARY GROSS ENROLLMENT RATE 
  
Model #1 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.4422 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value  
Median years of schooling 5.466907 2.34095 2.34 0.028  
Proportion in highest Wealth 
Quintile (fifth 
.15558 .198328 0.78 0.440  
Proportion of Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribe 
-.1018749 .1109667 -0.92 0.368  
Agriculture sector proportion of 
state GDP  
-16.51277 53.88347 -0.31 0.762  
Constant 28.18001 15.7734 1.79 0.087  
Model #2 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2756 
 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value  
Log of NSDP Per Capita 16.8333 4.931435 3.41 0.002  
Constant -120.3607 52.41226 -2.30 0.030  
51 
 
Model #3 Adjusted R-Squared: 0.2818 
 
Covariate Beta 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
T-statistic P-value  
Stunting rate among children 0-
56 months  
-.9664166 .3664475 -2.64 0.014  
Proportion of Rural Population 
(percent rural) 
-.2020768 .1555771 -1.30 0.205  
Constant  103.8293 12.94873 8.02 0.000  
 
  State Predicted level 
of education  
Actual 
Level of 
educatio
n 
Difference Ranking In order of 
Ranking 
1 
  Andhra Pradesh 
54.76 60.74 5.98 8 Himachal 
2 
  Arunachal Pradesh 
42.74 61.81 19.07 2 Arunachal 
Pradesh 
3 Assam 52.48 38.81 -13.67 26 Tamil Nadu 
4 
Bihar 
38.42 35.62 -2.80 18 Uttarakhand 
5 Chhattisgarh 52.27 54 1.73 11 Rajasthan 
6 Delhi 79.26 77.9 -1.36 16 Uttar Pradesh 
7 Goa 79.42 75.84 -3.58 18 Sikkim 
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8 
Gujarat 
62.21 43.43 -18.78 28 Andhra 
Pradesh 
9 Haryana 65.77 59.59 -6.18 23 Manipur 
10 Himachal 70.42 95.53 25.11 1 Jharkhand 
11 J & K 61.52 58.6 -2.92 19 Chhattisgarh 
12 Jharkhand 45.69 48.32 2.63 10 Meghalaya 
13 Karnataka 60.54 39.86 -20.68 29 Maharashtra 
14 Kerala 81.63 77.56 -4.07 21 Punjab 
15 Madhya 
Pradesh 
49.93 45.25 -4.68 22 West Bengal 
16 Maharashtra 67.15 67.81 0.66 13 Delhi 
17 Manipur 64.37 67.95 3.58 9 Mizoram 
18 Meghalaya 42.30 43.35 1.05 12 Bihar 
19 Mizoram 57.71 55.68 -2.03 17 J & K 
20 Nagaland 49.17 36.43 -12.74 25 Goa 
21 
Odisha 
50.44 36.54 -13.90 27 Kerala 
22 
Punjab 
70.32 70.19 -0.13 14 Madhya 
Pradesh 
23 Rajasthan 47.06 59.31 12.25 5 Haryana 
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24 Sikkim 58.89 68.23 9.34 7 Tripura 
25 Tamil Nadu 67.64 82.03 14.39 3 Nagaland 
26 Tripura 54.54 43.46 -11.08 24 Assam 
27 Uttar Pradesh 50.10 60.78 10.68 6 Odisha 
28 
Uttarakhand 
63.25 75.83 12.58 4 Gujarat 
29 West Bengal 51.99 51.54 -0.45 15 Karnataka 
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Chapter Three  
 
This chapter traces the emergence of subnationalism in Kerala and how that encouraged 
development in the region.58    
In the mid-nineteenth century, with all social, economic, and political arenas of 
life strictly structured around caste and religious identities, the Malayali-speaking regions 
of Travancore and Cochin, which comprise present-day Kerala, sustained one of the most 
oppressive and devout caste systems in all of India. While Brahmins comprised only 
about one percent of the population, they controlled most resources and commanded most 
authority across all social, political, and economic matters, situating themselves, without 
a doubt, at the top of this rigid system. They received tangible benefits from a Hindu state 
in the form of free meals and exemption from capital punishment or rigorous 
imprisonment, while engaged in lucrative professions like trade and money-lending that 
perpetuated their economic privilege, and most crucially, they occupied positions of 
power in the princely states. Maharajas (Kings) ruled their princely states in the name of 
Hindu deities, which made Brahmins especially useful to them for carrying out religious 
ceremonies, unlike the previously prominent caste of Nairs, who were Sudras, could not 
do without ‘contaminating’ the temples. Additionally, the Brahmins’ knowledge of 
English and the British administrative system made them a popular choice for delegation 
of political power. Of course, the privileged treatment of one group automatically implies 
a commensurate disadvantage for all others, but in this region, the caste system 
relentlessly oppressed all non-Brahmins, such that, there were strict restrictions on their 
                                                
58 Unless otherwise noted, this chapter follows chapters 3 and 4 in Singh, Prerna. "Subnationalism and Social Development: A 
Comparative Analysis of Indian States | World Politics." Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press, 05 June 2015. Web. 23 Apr. 
2018 
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use of public facilities, like roads, wells, and temples. They went so far as to delineate the 
exact physical distance that a Sudra must maintain from Brahmins, because unlike the 
upper castes across the rest of India who frowned upon touching lowers castes, the 
Brahmins in Travancore and Cochin believed that even proximity, to all non-Brahmins 
who they deemed as untouchables, caused ‘pollution.’  
In this setting, which was termed “a madhouse of caste” by social reformer 
Swami Vivekananda, there was no sense of community either within Hindus across 
castes nor across the larger Malayali political community. Guided by the ancient Hindu 
texts regarding government, the Travancore government directed its expenditures toward 
maintenance of the Palace, civil services, and the army along with religious functions, 
with no systematic efforts of improving the welfare of its people. The few social services 
that were available, like Ayurvedic medicine and indigenous schools, exclusively served 
upper castes. Lower-castes were not allowed admission into public schools and an 
absence of sanitary education and practices led to high mortality rates arising from 
preventable diseases.  
However, Protestant missionaries who had arrived in the region in the early 19th 
century supplemented the provision of public services, as they considered education to be 
a crucial requisite for their religious work, and provided the lower castes, “toward whom 
their proselytizing activities were targeted and whom they converted in large numbers, 
their first access to a systematic education.”59 They brought with them the first allopathic 
dispensaries, Western education, public health education, and most crucially, the notion 
of “equality of all before God,” which served all members of the community, regardless 
                                                
59 Singh, Prerna, 2011. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," World 
Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 282-293, February. 
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of the all-pervasive and deeply internalized caste hierarchy, allowing for the emergence 
of an ideological counter to the oppressive caste system. The Travancore government 
grew weary of these large-scale conversions and their implications on the viability of the 
Hindu state. Additionally, concerns regarding British annexation also grew, as evident in 
a letter from Lord Dalhousie to the Maharaja of Travancore, “which stated that ‘unless 
averted by timely and judicious reforms, annexation of Travancore is a distinct 
possibility.’”60  Combined, these concerns led the government to undertake limited 
reforms in the social sector, however, these largely remained an exercise exclusive to 
paper for many years thereafter, but did serve to slowly dismantle the vehicle of 
institutionalized discrimination.  
In this context, the region saw some instrumental changes in social and economic 
spheres, whereby, a possibility of redefining the prevailing norms emerged. These 
changes included, in the social arena, an undermining of the pervasive caste-system under 
the guidance of the missionaries and their teachings as well as wider access to western 
education across all strata of a deeply unequal society. In the economic realm, 
commercialization of agriculture, abolition of caste-based agrestic slavery, the state’s 
granting of ownership rights to tenants, and rapid rise in foreign trade fostered 
unprecedented economic mobility across caste lines. Arising from the western education 
and now economically flourishing agrarian group, was an upwardly mobile elite that 
sought political advancement. Under the previously mentioned reforms, which although 
had remained exclusive to paper, came the opportunity for this newly trained and 
mobilized elite from diverse social backgrounds, to engage in systematic contestation for 
                                                
60 Singh, Book, Page 131 
57 
 
political power. These reforms “emphasized merit rather than ritual status as the key 
criterion for recruitment to the sarkar (government) service…[f]or the first time in the 
history of the state, political power was now potentially accessible to members of all 
castes and communities and elites from politically un/under-represented groups, 
especially the Nayars, Syrian Christians, and Izhavas competed zealously and at times, 
bitterly, to stake their respective claims.”  
Such efforts by these newly-minted challenger elites, however, were successfully 
blocked by the small yet powerful Brahmin group. It is important to note here that these 
Brahmins hailed from across the Western ghats and were non-Malayali, making Malayali 
identity the primary source of cohesion among the native elites; uniting Christians, 
Muslims and lower caste Hindus under the umbrella of their Malayali land against the 
“foreign” Brahmins. Without giving up their caste or religious identities, the Nayar, 
Christian, and Izhava elites drew on shared symbols of Malayali identity like language, 
culture, and history, to come together in competing against the non-Malayali Brahmins. 
Recognizing that individually they might remain unheard and unrepresented, these 
groups initiated the first stirrings of Malayali subnationalism. “The espousal of a 
Malayali subnational identity, which drew on ancient myths of a shared origin, common 
heroes, and culture, was a purely instrumental calculation. Once it was evoked, however, 
it took on a powerful emotional valence.”61 The rigor garnered by the movement is most 
prolific in the “‘Malayali Memorial;’ a petition demanding greater native representation 
in public services submitted to the Travancore government in 1891, which had over 
10,000 signatories and claimed to express the grievances of all Malayalis—Nambudris, 
                                                
61 ‘Subnationalism and Social Development: A Comparative Analysis of Indian States’. World Politics, Vol. 67, No. 3  , July 2015 
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Nayars, Syrians, other Christians and Izhavas.”62 This served as the first united protest 
that “embodied not merely the grievance of a section of the people, but that of the 
community as a whole.”63 Unification along a Malayali community, across caste-
communal lines, began to materialize at the start of the 20th century. This period saw 
even the worst-off in the lowest rungs of the caste hierarchy, the “untouchable” Pulayas 
and Parayas, mobilize behind their leader Aiyankali to protest and dismantle the 
remaining mechanisms of discrimination. The overarching identification of the elites with 
their Malayali homeland curbed the potential for conflict inherent in caste and religious 
mobilization, uniting them across their other social cleavages. A large number of pan-
Kerala institutions and organizations further institutionalized and solidified this identity, 
spreading to the masses via the ‘Aikya Kerala’ (United Kerala) movement that began in 
the 1920s and demanded a united Malayali homeland and “fostered a recognition of the 
concept of equal rights for all.”64 
A “Kerala-wide consciousness of shared community” allowed for a societal 
consensus on the need for provision of health and education services to all Malayalis 
without discrimination. This subnationalism instilled a belief that “the well-being of all 
sections of the population was the collective responsibility of all Malayalis.”65 As such, 
both, upper and lower castes worked together to eradicate caste-based disabilities and 
move toward a socially equitable society that served all members. Public support was 
manifest in innumerous petitions, signed by growing numbers, to the government 
demanding the establishment of hospitals and schools. Consequently, the Travancore 
                                                
62 Singh, Prerna, 2011. "We-ness and Welfare: A Longitudinal Analysis of Social Development in Kerala, India," World 
Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 282-293, February. 
63 Ibid 
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governments’ expenditures on education and health increased sharply, and in contrast to 
prior reforms aimed solely at the elites and upper castes, these served all members. This 
is evident in the government's proclamation to educate all children irrespective of social 
identities and defray the entire cost of primary education in the state, as well as lifting 
restrictions banning ‘untouchables’ from departmental schools, even introducing 
affirmative action policies for lower castes via scholarships and fee waivers. Most 
notably, in the 1940s, the Travancore government instituted midday meals for all students 
in government primary schools, simultaneously intervening to positively impact their 
education and health outcomes. This policy has continued uninterrupted since its 
introduction, expanding significantly in the 1990s, even to other Indian states.  
The anti-caste and subnational movements fostered a political consciousness in 
the community, which encouraged them to hold their government accountable and 
complaints criticizing inaction or low quality in health and education became 
commonplace. Such complaints prompted the Travancore government to approach the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which had set up in India after the First World War, to establish 
a “public health department on modern lines in 1928.”66 While driven by its own agenda 
to research specific diseases, the Foundation focused on preventing malaria and filariasis, 
instead of water-borne cholera that ran rampant in the state. Still, their program was a 
resounding success and resulted in Kerala becoming the first Indian state to eradicate 
endemic malaria in 1965. It also provided a foundation to institutionalize public health 
provision, such that, while lower than education spending, medical expenditure increased 
six-fold during the period of 1900-1945; primarily spent on programs for vaccinations 
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and sanitation to curb preventable diseases that had previously caused high mortality, 
especially among the lower social groups. At this time, the Travancore government 
provided welfare largely in opposition to the British, who now complained that the 
princely states were providing too much welfare.  
An important and distinguishing characteristic of Kerala was the active popular 
involvement with the public goods provided. The public was encouraged to keep a check 
on these services, ensuring the quality of governance and effectiveness of services were 
top notch. This put Travancore and Cochin ahead of most other Indian provinces on most 
developmental indicators, including literacy rates and infant mortality rates. Yet, in 
absolute terms, these were still quite low; half the population was illiterate and life 
expectancy loomed at a meagre 29.5 years, while still uneven across demographic groups 
and geographic regions. Here, Malabar, the third Malayali region under British control, 
fared terribly on literacy and infant mortality compared to its Malayali brothers and sister 
in the princely states of Travancore and Cochin.  
The post-independence years marked a critical period in Kerala’s developmental 
trajectory, whereby, taking advantage of the newly instated democratic institutions, 
electoral competition became a foremost mechanism of holding elected governments 
responsive to public demands. There emerged a pattern of close contestation between the 
Communist Party and Congress Party; and the former’s campaign on a subnational 
narrative forced the latter to adopt Malayali subnationalism as well, further reinforcing 
community cohesion along Malayali identity even after independence. This led to 
unprecedented gains in education and health for members across all social strata, leading 
to equitable outcomes across gender, ethnic, rural-urban, and regional lines.  
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Kerala was formed on November 1, 1956, following the same mechanism of state 
formation being used across the country of bringing together regions which a spoke a 
common language. Accordingly, Princely states of Travancore and Cochin along with the 
British ruled Malabar were established as one entity under the state of Kerala. While 
different in their socio-economic conditions, the three regions shared their language - 
Malayalam - and henceforth were bound together. The success and depths of Malayali 
subnationalism is most evident in the petitions submitted by the Akiya Kerala movement 
to the States Reorganization Commission (SRC), in charge of craving out Indian states in 
a newly democratic nation. The petitions noted the essential need for a United Kerala in 
ensuring the welfare and development of all Mayalyalees, where this long-yearned 
homeland would be governed by natives who share “an attachment to the land and the 
people, which very often rises stronger and higher than reason and probably life 
itself...would lead Malayalis to toil for Kerala’s development”67 It is interesting to note 
the demand and support for the inclusion of Malabar, which by all accounting measures 
would at best be a developmental liability to the new state, were argued along deeply 
subnational notions like “Malabar can come into her own only as a part of Kerala state.”  
The newly formed state of Kerala created history by electing the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist) - the CPI(M) - to its state legislature - the first time a Marxist 
government was democratically brought to power anywhere in the world.68 The party’s 
success has been attributed “above all, by its ability to manipulate the regional patriotism 
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of all Kerala.”69 The state’s first chief minister, EMS Namboodiripad, is considered the 
architect of modern Kerala. Under his leadership, immediate efforts were undertaken to 
reform remnants of the conventional socio-economic class structure, paving the path for 
Kerala’s long-term equitable and progressive development. Foremost were the 
introduction of the Education Bill and the abolishment of the feudal land ownership 
system under what has been heralded as “one of the most radical and successful land 
reform bills in the world.”70 In the 1960s, Kerala was home to the highest number of 
agricultural workers in India, but suffered from deep inequality in the distribution of land, 
allowing exploitation of peasants and landless laborers by landlords, who owned 37 
percent of the land while constituting only 2.3% of all agricultural households. In 
advocating for land rights for the landless, further deepening mass consciousness against 
caste-based discrimination, and other related equitable reforms, the Communist 
government gained instant popularity among the disadvantaged populous of Kerala. The 
Land tenure system reforms are seen as the “foundational feature of Kerala’s 
development...and social and economic progress.”71   
Successive governments, irrespective of party, have overwhelmingly focused on 
the provision and expansion of primary education and healthcare.  The CPI(M) and 
Congress have without exception alternated control on the state government every 
election cycle, making both parties highly responsive to public opinion. “In recent years, 
Kerala’s history of a powerful and inclusive subnationalism has become established 
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enough to be showcased as a model in a speech by the Indian Prime Minister.”72 The 
Communist Party’s platform of welfare for all Malayalees has been an overarching guide 
in the state, regardless of which party is actually in office, as the other forms the 
opposition and encourages accountability, while still serving as a force for political 
mobilization in the community. Social welfare has emerged as the foremost policy 
platform on which the two parties compete intensely and relentlessly attempt to outdo the 
each other in the expansion of the social security net. This commitment is “brought out 
by the striking fact that no major public service or redistributive program in Kerala has 
ever been reversed, despite a precarious financial position and a decline in central 
financial support.”73  
That Malayali subnationalism has taken deep popular roots has been evident time 
and again. For instance, a 1996 survey showed that 91 percent of the Hindus, who are the 
dominant religious group in Kerala, believed it is the government’s duty to protect the 
rights of religious minorities, compared with 60 percent Hindus across India who shared 
this sentiment.  Kerala’s post-independence extensive social policy, as formulated and 
implemented by democratic governments, has been characterized by a redistributive 
nature. Social service provisions have been undertaken commensurate to well thought out 
targeting of beneficiaries coming from the most disadvantaged groups like Scheduled 
castes and tribes, women, rural populations, socially backward residents of Malabar 
region and the poor population. This is in stark contrast to the investments in secondary 
and higher education that have occurred throughout other Indian states, which by design 
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have benefitted the elite segments most. Compared with other Indian states, Kerala saw 
lower GDP per capita for most of the post-independence period, only surpassing the 
national average over the last decade. Yet, its per capita government expenditures on 
health and education have consistently been the highest. The masses in Kerala have 
inculcated a political consciousness, awareness, and activism, far above the Indian 
average as indicated in surveys conducted through 1967, 1996, 2004. This is a crucial and 
distinguishing feature of Kerala and accounts for the public vigilance that has been 
instrumental in ensuring the effectiveness of health and primary education services; for 
example, in monitoring and curbing absenteeism of government teachers and healthcare 
workers.  
Bottom-up activism has allowed public concerns to dictate the government's 
policy agenda, leading to top-down state policies that best represent public interests. As 
such, Kerala has achieved the equivalent of middle-income countries in its literacy rates, 
with a life expectancy of 74 years it is 10 years above the average Indian life expectancy 
and falls in the top 30 percent countries in the world. In 1950s, Kerala’s Infant Mortality 
was similar to India’s, but unlike the rest of India, Kerala focused on women’s education 
and advancement over the following decades and has been able to achieve unparalleled 
success in reducing IMR. “Today a child in Kerala is almost five times more likely to live 
beyond her first birthday as compared to a child in any other state in India. Kerala’s IMR 
puts it among the top 33 percent of all countries of the world.”74 These resounding 
achievements remain incomplete without noting the equitable manner in which they have 
been accomplished. For example, “various surveys suggest that income has not been a 
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major determinant of access to better health facilities in the state.”75 Unlike the urban-
rural discrepancy in women’s life expectancy (67 years versus 59 years) across India, 
Kerala sustains equality at a high 75 years. Muslims in Kerala are also better off, with a 
90 percent literacy rate they as likely as their Hindu Malayali brothers to be able to read 
and 30 percent more likely the average Indian Muslim. “A rural scheduled caste female is 
more than twice as likely to be literate if she lives in Kerala as compared to any other 
state in India. A member of the Scheduled Tribes is almost 20% more likely to be literate 
in Kerala than another Indian state. Social indicators in the northern Malabari districts, 
which were at a distinct development disadvantage at the time of Kerala’s formation, are 
now virtually equivalent to the rest of Kerala.”76 
Today, Malayalis are justly proud of the social development achievements made 
by their homeland. It is important to note here that their sense of community identity, 
while certainly reinforced by such warranted pride, does not stem from it. As this chapter 
has highlighted, the path of Malayali subnationalism was initiated after socio-economic 
changes that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century facilitated a process of elite 
competition for political power. These challenger elites from diverse social backgrounds 
jointly employed historic but latent symbols that exemplified their shared culture, namely 
their language --Malayalam. Mobilizing along their shared identity untied them against 
the non-Malayali Brahmins who had conventionally commanded authority and 
maintained an oppressive social system in the region. The growth of the Aikya Kerala 
movement in the subsequent decades transmitted Malayali subnationalism to the masses, 
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paving the way for a politically active citizenry that was effective in influencing its 
government's policy agenda in favor of provision of public goods, along with societal 
monitoring of such provisions, so that all of Kerala might have welfare and development 
as evident in the state’s health and education outcomes.  
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Chapter Four 
This chapter77 traces the historical social dynamics within the state of Uttar Pradesh, to 
show how the lack of a subnational solidarity as well as the presence of powerful 
associations on dimensions above and below the sub-nation, like national, caste, and 
religious identities, have hampered social development in the state.  
In the mid-nineteenth century, Muslims constituted only 13 percent of the 
population of the Northwestern Provinces of Agra and Awadh, which comprise present-
day UP, but like the non-Malayali Brahmins in Travancore, they dominated the social, 
political, and economic life of the province. They held significant sway over land and 
government services - the two most important sources of power in the region. 
Additionally, Muslims also prevailed in the social and cultural life of the province, as 
evident in the preference of Urdu as the form of expression due to the continued 
dominance of Muslim elites in the community’s cultural life. “Life in the towns of the 
province was suffused with Persian-Urdu etiquette and was conducted in an 
overwhelmingly Muslim idiom.”  
Like Travancore, the Northwestern provinces also witnessed key exogenous 
changes in the mid-nineteenth century which impacted the prevailing socio-economic 
conditions. These changes were similar to those occurring in Travancore; namely, the 
emergence of a challenge to the caste system, changes in agriculture and trade, and 
limited opportunities for Western education. Growth of railways led to an expansion in 
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trade, creating a wealthy class of middlemen, predominantly from Hindu merchant castes. 
Colonial officers opened government schools and colleges that served as the first 
opportunity for citizens to become literate in English. These opportunities led to an 
improvement in the socio-economic well-being of the politically non-dominant Hindu 
merchant caste, cultivating them into an upwardly mobile elite that could now attempt to 
seek political power that now their higher socio-economic status warranted. At this time, 
the British found their administrative system inefficient, and introduced two crucial 
reforms: recruitment to government services based on merit and the introduction of the 
elective principle into local government. Growing concerned about the domination of 
certain groups, they introduced caste and communal reservations in government services. 
These reforms benefited the Hindus more than they did Muslims; for example, Hindus 
were better able to adapt to English education, as they had done previously with Urdu 
when the Mughals had come to India, whereas large portions of Muslims continued to 
attend private schools that instructed Islamic studies in Urdu. As such, a class of 
challenger elites was formed in the Hindu merchant group, who were now able to 
compete for power and attempt to overthrow the centuries-long dominance of Muslim 
elites. This led to intense competition for political power between the two groups.  
At this time, “the differences within Hindu and Muslim communities were greater 
than the distinctions between the two.” Even though the two groups shared many 
symbols, including a common spoken language be it called Hindustani, Hindi, or Urdu. 
“Yet, in their attempt to break Muslim dominance over positions of political power, 
challenger Hindu elites chose to emphasize the divisive symbols of Hindi and Urdu as the 
distinct, exclusive, and mutually opposed mother tongues of Hindus and Muslims 
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respectively, over potentially unifying symbols, such as Hindustani as a shared lingua 
franca for the province.”78 This was possible because Hindi written in Devanagari script 
is comparable with colloquial Hindustani but distinct from written Urdu. Therefore, 
mobilization of Hindu challenger elites in UP, even though similar to Travancore in 
uniting along shared language, took place along religious lines. Since the dominant 
Muslims were native to the province and as such could not be made an ‘out-group’ along 
subnational sentiment, religious rather than subnational symbols were more useful to 
them. Threatened Muslims in turn championed Urdu in Persian script as the official 
vernacular of the province, instated agitational institutions like the Urdu Defense 
Association, and denounced the “Hindi movement” as malicious toward Muslim 
interests. Seeing the electoral success of Hindu elites in local elections, Muslim leaders 
turned to the British rulers for patronage as their only method to maintain their privilege. 
Requests included separate electorates for Muslims and weightage in any representative 
system; these were the first stirrings of what lead to Muslim separatism and bloody 
communal violence in the next decades in India.  
At this time, “an analysis of local newspapers in the province showed that [elites] 
came also to mobilize for policies, and goods and services, including social services, for 
the exclusive benefit of their group.”79 In demanding schools and colleges for the 
advancement of their ‘countrymen,’ the elites employed terms like nation, nationality, or 
countrymen in reference to members of their respective religions, unlike Kerala where 
such terms were inclusive of all residents. The elites began viewing development not only 
along communal lines, but worse, as a zero-sum game where they not only promoted the 
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advancement of their own group but also prevented that of the other. There was no 
common identity and no demand for the collective welfare of all the state’s residents. 
“The lack of elite pressure or popular demand meant that social policy did not occupy a 
prominent place on the policy agenda.”80 The lack of community mobilization and 
demand for social services left the British and Christian Missionaries as the primary 
source of discerning what few services they might provide. Few initiatives included 
expanding schools in select towns, sanitation programs, and a gradual increase in health 
care facilities, which were largely met with popular indifference. A long-serving British 
magistrate and collector, W. H. Crooke, “noted that an absence of fellow-feeling among 
the residents of the state made them ‘destitute of regard for the public weal’ and 
prevented them from acting ‘to secure what is of primary importance to their welfare.’”81 
At the start of British rule, the Northwestern Provinces were cited as the model for rest of 
India, but to the shock of the administrators, social statics showed it had turned into the 
most illiterate region of the country.  
Until the early twentieth century, the Hindu-Hindi and Muslim-Urdu identities 
remained exclusive to the elites in these groups. “The diffusion of elite identities to the 
population at large is contingent on their espousal by a sociopolitical movement or 
association.”82 Just how the Aikya Kerala movement brought the masses on board with 
their challenger elites, political-religious organizations in the Northwestern provinces, 
like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League, “played a critical role from the 1920s 
onward in the mass dissemination of the mutually reinforcing and divisive religious-
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linguistic identities of Hindi-Hindu versus Urdu-Muslim.” Gandhi, growing concerned by 
what he saw as increased social division, promoted Hindustani in either Persian or 
Devanagari script to build unity, to no avail however, as the proliferation of religious 
organizations and movements had created sufficient divide. This was amplified by the 
British who provided separate electorates for Muslims, and regularly followed their 
policy of “divide and rule” to further their own interests. By the 1940s, Hindu and 
Muslim identities were firmly embedded in the popular consciousness of UP. Singh 
notes:83 
At the end of the colonial period UP therefore had clearly not witnessed the 
emergence of any kind of a subnational identity. Instead, the province had turned 
out to be the crucible for the creation of Pakistan as a homeland for the 
subcontinent’s Muslims and the emergence of Hindu nationalism, which was to 
remain an important force in the politics of India after independence.  
 
UP has not be able to establish any sort of subnational identity, as most evident in the 
lack of a noun, like Malayali, Tamil, Rajasthani, Punjabi, Bengali and so on, to describe 
the people of UP.84 Even its name is a direct translation of Northern Province, as there 
was no naturally fitting names like those of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, or Rajasthan, and the 
Constituent Assembly did not find a name representative of the diversity within, 
eventually hastily agreeing on Uttar Pradesh.  
UP was formed as purely an administrative unit; its boundaries hardly indicate or 
encourage a shared sense of identity in culture or history. Several petitions to the SRC for 
carving out other, better representative states from UP were refused primarily on grounds 
of promoting the national good. “The most important, and eventually successful, 
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secessionist movement that UP faced has been the demand for a separate hill state of 
Uttarakhand/Uttaranchal...In recent years, encouraged no doubt by the success of the 
Uttarakhand agitation, demands have resurfaced for the breakup of UP to form a range of 
new provinces: Harit Pradesh, Doab Pradesh, Bundelkhand, Purvanchal, and Awadh 
Pradesh, to name only a few.”85 Additionally, social cleavages along religion persist, 
while those along caste have become the state’s most important ethnic fault line in recent 
years, owing to lower caste mobilization and formation of Dalit parties. Thus, “the locus 
of popular identification in UP has tended to lie either above the subnational community, 
with the national realm, or with ethnic identities.”86  
Following Independence, UP “had succeeded in projecting their province as the 
‘heartland’ of the new nation,” due to its history as the birthplace of Hinduism, leading 
role in the National Movement, and a demographic enormity that bestowed it with the 
single largest number of seats in the central parliament. This has allowed for UP 
politicians to wield immense power; all but two prime ministers during the period of 
1947-1991 hailed from UP. Jairam Ramesh, a prominent UP politician noted, “The future 
of India is inextricably linked to what happens or does not happen in UP.”87 As such, the 
state came to view itself as more synonymous with the nation, to their own, and even the 
nation’s, detriment. Its lack of subnationalism was argued to be an asset; as seen in the 
words of UP’s first Chief Minister, “the only viable administrative unit that was 
unaffected by either linguism or provincialism...[UP’s greatness lies] in its people’s sense 
of oneness with other parts of India, overriding local and state considerations”88 As such, 
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UP’s constant prioritization of India and the central government has cultivated a norm of 
the politicians rarely being concerned with local development, instead, yearning for 
prominence in New Delhi. 
“UP’s propinquity to the national domain – both in terms of national leaders 
controlling state politics and state leaders pursuing power at the national level – 
completely crippled subnational politics in the state.” The National Election Survey of 
1971 indicates, in stark contrast to Kerala, the residents of UP were more concerned with 
national politics and higher proportions identified more with the nation than their state. In 
line with national considerations, voters consistently voted for the ineffective Congress 
party, as support for the party which reigns in New Delhi. Government expenditures 
followed the central agenda instead of state needs, prioritizing spending on economic 
services with no regard for social services.  
The lack of identification with, or mobilization around, a subnational identity 
played an important role in the low levels of interest in, consciousness of, and proclivity 
to participate in, the public life of the state on the part of UP’s citizens. Relatedly, there is 
little vigilance or demand for accountability; “Drèze and Gazdar document a long-
standing pattern of popular indifference and inertia toward problems in the delivery of 
education and health services, notably teacher and doctor absenteeism.”89 
Since the 1990s, politics and popular identification have been based on religion 
and caste. In late 1980s, the Bharatiya Janata Party began growing and mobilizing Hindu 
support in UP, in contrast to its subnational movement in Rajasthan. During this period, 
UP also witnessed powerful lower caste movements, culminating in a proliferation of 
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caste-based parties, the most prominent of which are the militant dalit party named 
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP), which primarily represents 
backward castes, especially Yadavs and Muslims. The politicization of caste was evident 
in voting patterns in UP, where over 50 percent voted in line with their own caste through 
the 1990s, compared with Kerala’s 5 percent or all-India average of 26 percent. 
Thereafter, governance is UP has been characterized by the targeting of social 
expenditures toward specific groups, in what appears to be clientelist politics. While even 
these targeted policies have made little impact, the question about the viability of 
employing targeted policies in a society that is largely underdeveloped is too intertwined 
with the sentiments and politics of the region to receive a fair appraisal, as desperately 
needed for the sake of the region.  
There is a lack of political will and interest when it comes to improving social 
services for its people. This is evident in the states poor implementation of the nationally 
sponsored Midday Meal program, disinterest in the success of the Total Literacy 
Campaign, and sustained decline in government spending on health and education since 
the 1990s. This is sadly evident in UP’s position as the only Indian state with a lack of 
innovation in policy, as noted by Singh:90  
Kerala is famous for its literacy drives, Tamil Nadu for its nutrition schemes, 
Maharashtra for employment guarantee, Gujarat for drought relief, Karnataka for 
panchayati raj, Himachal Pradesh for primary education, West Bengal for land 
reform...Even poor, BIMARU states such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh have 
launched important social initiatives such as the Shiksha Karmi program and the 
Education Guarantee Scheme respectively, which were subsequently adopted at 
an all-India level.  
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This government apathy is matched by public indifference, which likely reinforce 
one another, ending in a vicious cycle of low development and unaccountability. “The 
political fragmentation of UP along caste and religious lines has been mirrored in the 
social sphere...based on extensive field research, Drèze and Gazdar argue that this ‘highly 
divided nature of the rural society’ has ‘seriously constrained’ collaborative public action 
to ensure the effective provision of social services in UP’s villages.” Singh notes that, 
“interestingly, the UP government itself highlights “public apathy” as one of the main 
causes for the “disarray” of social services in the state (http://upgov.nic 
.in/upinfo/up_eco.html)”  
The government and public failure to delineate any conception of a progressive 
social policy has resulted in UP experiencing a sustained plague of some of the worst 
human development indicators in all of India. UP has the worst malnutrition rates in the 
country, with near half its children being underweight and over half are stunted. It has the 
worst infant mortality and maternal mortality rates in the country. A report by the WHO 
reports the density of Allopathic doctors per lakh population in UP is 63.5, near the all 
India level of 61.5. But when disaggregated by educational qualification, it shows some 
astounding statistics: it drops to 35.9 for allopathic doctors with more than secondary 
schooling, implying that 27.6 do not have even secondary education. This drops further to 
a staggering 11.7 for allopathic doctors with a medical qualification, far below the all 
India average of 26.2 and worst in the country.91  
Literacy rates remain below the national average, even though significant gains 
were made in the past decade due to central government and International donor agencies 
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implementing large-scale educational campaigns, including notably Operation 
Blackboard, the Education Guarantee Scheme, Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, and the District 
Primary Education Program. For all its focus on targeting dalits, UP does not have much 
to show for it; with its overall underdevelopment leading to a reality in which a dalit 
women in Tamil Nadu is better off on all social indicators than a upper-caste women in 
UP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis determined an estimated expected performance of the Indian states on 
development outcomes of health, education, and poverty, after controlling for covariates 
that indicated a state’s resource endowment, in different spheres like human capital or per 
capita net state domestic product. The aim was to identify states that have performed 
above and below what could be expected of them, conditioned on their resources. The 
findings of this thesis support recent literature on human development, specifically Prerna 
Singh’s work on welfare and solidarity in Indian states. The state rankings across the 
three indicators in this thesis resonate with the findings of Singh.  
Following in her line, this thesis puts forth the argument of subnational solidarity 
as a key determinant of developmental performance. The intuition behind this, as 
supported by the evidence presented in the case study chapters, is that in controlling for 
non-policy variables, the data led to estimations that likely can be attributed to policy-
related matters. While not focusing on specific policies, this thesis addresses the factors 
that influence good, pro-social and pro-poor policy choices by some states and not others. 
This is absolutely essential to identify and note, since India remains plagued by high 
regional disparity, and without cultivating an enabling environment, imposition of even 
well-thought out polices might not take root. In this regard, the data analysis chapter 
actually captures exactly that – different social policy choices leading to different 
outcomes, while different levels of subnationlism has been identified as the primary 
source of influencing what items make to a state’s policy agenda in the first place. The 
argument here is not whether a specific policy is effective or not, because although that is 
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important, this thesis has identified subnational solidarity as a necessary requisite for 
good policies to gain traction and eventually become effective. While this thesis focuses 
on two states, this analysis can be applied to the other states as well. A crucial 
consequence of subnationalism as pro-social enabling environment, for policy, relates to 
a cautioned decentralization of governance; whereby, those echelons of government that 
citizens interact with most should be in charge of providing social services 
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